Why The Republican Party Elected Lincoln -DiLorenzo 2003

 

Why the Republican Party Elected Lincoln

by Thomas J. DiLorenzo
by Thomas J. DiLorenzo

It is occasionally possible to see through the fog of mysticism, superstition, lies, and the romantic, happy-faced, floating butterfly vision of Abraham Lincoln that has been created by American court historians over the past century. One place to begin is the gem of a book by Pulitzer prize-winning Lincoln biographer David Donald entitled Lincoln Reconsidered. In a particularly important passage Donald quotes Senator John Sherman of Ohio, the brother of General William Tecumseh Sherman and Republican Party powerhouse from the 1860s to the 1890s who was chairman of the U.S Senate Finance Committee during the Lincoln administration, on why the Republican Party nominated and elected Abraham Lincoln.

"Those who elected Mr. Lincoln expect him . . . to secure to free labor its just right to the Territories of the United States; to protect . . . by wise revenue laws, the labor of our people; to secure the public lands to actual settlers . . . ; to develop the internal resources of the country by opening new means of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific."

Donald then claims to translate this statement "from the politician's idiom" into plain English. Lincoln and the Republican Party "intended to enact a high protective tariff that mothered monopoly, to pass a homestead law that invited speculators to loot the public domain, and to subsidize a transcontinental railroad that afforded infinite opportunities for jobbery."
This is what is so refreshing about David Donald, the best and most honest of all the mainstream "Lincoln scholars." He understood that "wise revenue laws" meant a 47 percent tariff on imports that would plunder the Southern states especially severely; he understood that "free labor" meant white labor, and protecting the white race's "just right to the territories" meant disallowing labor market competition from either slaves or free blacks. At the time, the small number of free blacks in the North had no real citizenship rights and some states, like Lincoln's Illinois, had amended their constitutions to make it illegal for blacks to move into the state.
Donald also understood that "developing the internal resources of the country" was a euphemism for the colossal corruption that would inevitably accompany massive federally-funded subsidies to railroad corporations.
The financial powers behind the Republican Party in 1860 were the Northern railroad barons, Northern manufacturers who wanted protectionist tariffs to protect them from competition, and Northern bankers and investors like Jay Cooke who wanted to use their political connections to make a killing financing a transcontinental railroad (among other schemes, such as central banking). They decided at the Chicago Republican National Convention of 1860 that Abraham Lincoln was the perfect political front man for their corrupt, mercantilist agenda.
The Great Railroad Lobbyist
From the time he entered politics in 1832, Abraham Lincoln aspired to such a position. That is why he became a Whig, the party of the moneyed elite. Lincoln was one of the most money- and power-hungry politicians in American history. (Indeed, this would seem to be a prerequisite for anyone who is capable of being elected president).
As soon as he entered the Illinois legislature he led his local delegation in a successful Whig Party effort to appropriate some $12 million in taxpayer subsidies for railroad and canal-building corporations. In his landmark book, Lincoln and the Railroads, first published in 1927 and reprinted in 1981 by Arno Press, John W. Starr, Jr. noted how one of Lincoln's colleagues in the legislature said "He seemed to be a born politician. We followed his lead . . . " And they followed Lincoln down a road that would nearly bankrupt the state of Illinois. The $12 million was squandered: Almost no projects were completed with it; much of the money was stolen; and the taxpayers of Illinois were put deep into debt for years to come.
Lincoln's "internal improvements" fiasco in Illinois promised to build "a railroad from Galena in the extreme northwestern part of the state." Above St. Louis, in Alton, "three [rail]roads were to radiate"; "There was also a road to run from Quincy . . . through Springfield"; another one "from Warsaw . . . to Peoria"; and yet another "from Pekin . . . to Bloomington" (Starr, pp. 25—26). The first road mentioned was to become the Illinois Central, which would later employ Lincoln for more than a decade as one its top lawyers.
Lincoln and the Whigs saw to it that "the Assembly also voted wildly and injudiciously in the matter of banking legislation," urging the legislature to print paper money to help finance what his personal secretaries, Nicolay and Hay, would later say was "a disaster to the state." Lincoln's law partner, William Herndon, described the whole debacle as "that sanguine epidemic of financial and industrial quackery which devastated the entire community" (p. 28). The whole scheme was eventually abandoned, and taxes were raised sharply on the hapless Illinois taxpayers to pay off the debt.
The 1837 internal improvements debacle in Illinois may have been a disaster for the public, but it helped catapult a young Abraham Lincoln into position as one of the top — if not the top — lawyer/lobbyists in the country for the railroad corporations.
By 1860 the Illinois Central Railroad was one of the largest corporations in the world. In a company history, J. G. Drennan noted that "Mr. Lincoln was continuously one of the attorneys for the Illinois Central Railroad Company from its organization [in 1849] until he was elected President" (Starr, p. 58). He was called on by the company's general counsel to litigate dozens of cases. He was such a railroad industry "insider" that he often rode in private cars and carried a free railroad pass, courtesy of the Illinois Central.
Lincoln successfully defended the Illinois Central against McLean County, Illinois, which wanted to tax the corporation, for which he was paid $5,000, an incredible sum for a single tax case in the 1850s. The man who paid him the fee was George B. McClellan, the vice president of the Illinois Central who in 1862 would become the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac and, later, Lincoln's opponent in the 1864 election. Starr explains the dishonest ruse that was apparently used by Lincoln and McClellan to trick the Illinois Central's New York City-based board of directors to go along with such an unprecedented fee to a "country lawyer" from Illinois.
McClellan would formally refuse to pay such a large fee, making his directors happy. Then Lincoln would sue the Illinois Central for the fee. But when Lincoln went to court over the fee (armed with depositions from other Illinois lawyers that such astronomical fees were perfectly appropriate!) no lawyers for the company showed up and he won by default. Proof that this was all a ruse lies in the fact that "Lincoln . . . continued to handle [the Illinois Central's] litigation afterwards, the same as he had done before" (p. 79).
By the late 1850s, writes Starr, it was widely known that "Lincoln's close relations with powerful industrial interests" are "always potent and present in political counsels" (p. 67). In today's language, he was the equivalent of a powerful, rich and politically influential "K Street lobbyist." He often traveled "with a party of officials of the Illinois Central company. He rode in a private car, on his own pass furnished him in his capacity as attorney for the company." This "greatly impressed some of the young Republican leaders . . ." This was the real Lincoln, and it is diametrically opposed to the image of the modest, backwoods "rail splitter" that the court historians have created.
In a masterpiece of understatement, Starr comments that "Lincoln's rise [in politics] was coincident with that of the railroads" (p. 80). In addition to working for the Illinois Central, Lincoln also represented the Chicago and Alton, Ohio and Mississippi, and Rock Island Railroad corporations. As soon as the Chicago and Mississippi Railroad was built, he was appointed as the local attorney for that company as well. By 1860 Lincoln was the most prominent attorney/lobbyist the railroad industry had. He was so prominent that the New York financier Erastus Corning offered him the job of general counsel of the New York Central Railroad at a salary of $10,000 a year, an incredible sum at the time. Lincoln turned down the offer after agonizing over it.
Lincoln also used his status as one of the top political insiders within the railroad industry to engage in some very lucrative real estate investments. On one of his trips in a private rail car accompanied by an entourage of Illinois Central executives Lincoln "decided to go to Council Bluffs, Iowa, where he had some real estate investments" (p. 152). "Shortly before his trip to Council Bluffs," writes Starr, "Abraham Lincoln had purchased several town lots from his fellow railroad attorney, Norman B. Judd, who had acquired them from the Chicago and Rock Island Railroad. Council Bluffs at this time was a frontier town, containing about fifteen hundred people" (p. 195). To this day, this land in Council Bluffs, Iowa is known as "Lincoln's Hill."
Why invest in real estate in Council Bluffs, Iowa, of all places? Why not Chicago or even Springfield, the state capital? Because Lincoln the political insider knew that there was a very high likelihood that 1) the federal government would eventually subsidize a transcontinental railroad; and 2) the starting point for that railroad could well be in the vicinity of Council Bluffs. If so, the value of his real estate holdings would be wildly inflated and he would make a killing.
Indeed, the 1860 Republican Party Platform contained a sixteenth plank that read: "That a railroad to the Pacific Ocean is imperatively demanded by the interests of the whole country; the Federal Government ought to render immediate and efficient aid in its construction . . ." As the party's nominee, Lincoln pledged his wholehearted support of this plank. In the interests of "the whole country," of course.
When he became president legislation was immediately proposed, in a special legislative session called by Lincoln in July of 1861, to create the taxpayer-subsidized Union Pacific Railroad. "There was no firmer friend of the Union Pacific bill than the President himself," writes Starr. (In contrast, most mainstream "Lincoln scholars" make the preposterous assertion that he had nothing to do with such legislation). The bill was passed in 1862 and it gave the president the power to appoint all the directors and commissioners and, more importantly, "to fix the point of commencement" of the Union Pacific Railroad. And guess where Lincoln chose to fix the point of commencement of the railroad. He "fixed the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific Railroad . . . at Council Bluffs, Iowa" (p. 202). His financial gains must have dwarfed Corning's $10,000 salary offer. During the Grant administrations dozens of prominent people would go to federal prison for such criminal self-dealing but Lincoln, the ringleader of the whole enterprise, has up to now escaped scrutiny.
In addition to lining his own pockets with this piece of legislation, proving to his well-heeled supporters that he was indeed "one of them," the legislation was essentially the Mother of all Political Payoffs. One hundred fifty-eight of the prominent Northern bankers, industrialists, and railroad barons who had supported Lincoln's political career were appointed as "commissioners." As Dee Brown wrote in Hear that Lonesome Whistle Blow: The Epic Story of the Transcontinental Railroads, when Lincoln signed the bill creating the Union Pacific he "assured the fortunes of a dynasty of American families . . . Brewsters, Bushnells, Olcotts, Harkers, Harrisons, Trowbridges, Langworthys, Reids, Ogdens, Bradfords, Noyeses, Brooks, Cornells, and dozens of others . . ." (p. 49).
What does all this have to do with Lincoln's war "to save the union"? The answer is, "everything." The official reason for the war that was given by both Lincoln and the U.S. Congress was "to save the union." But Lincoln inherited no "perpetual union." The union of the founding fathers was a voluntary compact of the states. The states delegated certain powers to the central government as their agent, but retained sovereignty for themselves. Secession was considered a legitimate option by political and opinion leaders from all sections of the country in 1860, as I document quite extensively in The Real Lincoln.
In his First Inaugural Address Lincoln promised that he had no intention of disturbing Southern slavery, and that even if he did it would be unconstitutional to do so. In the same speech he pledged his support of a proposed constitutional amendment that had just passed the U.S. Senate two days earlier (after passing the House of Representatives) that would have forbidden the federal government from ever interfering with Southern slavery. In other words, he was perfectly willing to see Southern slavery persist long after his own lifetime.
But on the issue of taxation he was totally uncompromising. The Republican Party was about to more than double the average tariff rate (from 15 percent to over 32 percent), and then increase it again to 47 percent. The Morrill Tariff passed the House of Representatives in the 1859 session, before Lincoln's nomination and before any serious movement toward secession. In the First Inaugural Lincoln clearly stated that it was his obligation as president to "collect the duties and imposts," but beyond that "there will be no invasion of any state." He was telling the South: "We are going to economically plunder you by doubling and tripling the tariff rate (the main source of federal revenue at the time), and if you refuse to collect the higher tariffs, as the South Carolinians did with the 1828 "Tariff of Abominations," there will be an invasion. That is, there will be mass killing, mayhem, and total war.
Why was the tariff so important — even more important than the issue of slavery in the eyes of Abraham Lincoln? Because tariff revenues comprised about 90 percent of federal revenue, and if the Southern states seceded they would no longer pay the federal tariff. All the grandiose plans of building a transcontinental railroad with taxpayer subsidies and creating a continental empire would be destroyed, and along with them the political career of Abraham Lincoln and, possibly, the Republican Party itself. The union was "saved" geographically but destroyed philosophically by the waging of total war on the civilian population of the South, a war in which nearly one half of the adult white male population was either killed or mutilated.
Three months after the war, Generals Grant, Sherman and Sheridan would commence a twenty-five year campaign of ethnic genocide against the Plains Indians to make the American West safe for the subsidized transcontinental railroads. Sherman (who was also a railroad industry-related real estate investor) explicitly stated that the purpose of eradicating the Plains Indians was to make sure that they did not stand in the way of the government-subsidized railroads.
By ignoring this true history of how a modestly successful trial lawyer from Illinois came to be the nominee of the moneyed elite that ran the Republican Party in 1860, America's court historians have railroaded the public into believing a fairy tale version of their own history. The popular notion that the Republican Party's early leaders were Selfless Humanitarians is as big a lie as has ever been told.

-tom dilorenzo 2003-










How obvious does it need to be??? Court Historians and selective memory seems to be the best way to follow the "Church of Lincoln"


Please check out the great site to the great cause LINK HERE

-Matt Bowden-
DALLAS TEXAS CSA
DEO VINDICE
GOD SAVE THE SOUTH!!!

A look at the Morill Tariff and Taxation/Tariffs and the War for Southern Independence

Most Americans believe the U. S. “Civil War” was over slavery.  They have to an enormous degree been miseducated.  The means and timing of handling the slavery issue were at issue, although not in the overly simplified moral sense that lives in postwar and modern propaganda.  But had there been no Morrill Tariff there might never have been a war.  The conflict that cost of the lives of 650,000 Union and Confederate soldiers and perhaps as many as 50,000 Southern civilians and impoverished many millions for generations might never have been.

A smoldering issue of unjust taxation that enriched Northern manufacturing states and exploited the agricultural South was fanned to a furious blaze in 1860.  It was the Morrill Tariff that stirred the smoldering embers of regional mistrust and ignited the fires of Secession in the South. This precipitated a Northern reaction and call to arms that would engulf the nation in the flames of war for four years.

Prior to the U. S. “Civil War” there was no U. S. income tax.  Considerably more than 90% of U. S. government revenue was raised by a tariff on imported goods.  A tariff is a tax on selected imports, most commonly finished or manufactured products.   A high tariff is usually legislated not only to raise revenue, but also to protect domestic industry form foreign competition.  By placing such a high, protective tariff on imported goods it makes them more expensive to buy than the same domestic goods.  This allows domestic industries to charge higher prices and make more money on sales that might otherwise be lost to foreign competition because of cheaper prices (without the tariff) or better quality.  This, of course, causes domestic consumers to pay higher prices and have a lower standard of living.  Tariffs on some industrial products also hurt other domestic industries that must pay higher prices for goods they need to make their products.  Because the nature and products of regional economies can vary widely, high tariffs are sometimes good for one section of the country, but damaging to another section of the country.  High tariffs are particularly hard on exporters since they must cope with higher domestic costs and retaliatory foreign tariffs that put them at a pricing disadvantage.  This has a depressing effect on both export volume and profit margins.  High tariffs have been a frequent cause of economic disruption, strife and war.

Prior to 1824 the average tariff level in the U. S.  had been in the 15 to 20 % range. This was thought sufficient to meet federal revenue needs and not excessively burdensome to any section of the country.  The increase of the tariff to a 20% average in 1816 was ostensibly to help pay for the War of 1812.  It also represented a 26% net profit increase to Northern manufacturers.

In 1824 Northern manufacturing states and the Whig Party under the leadership of Henry Clay began to push for high, protective tariffs.  These were strongly opposed by the South.  The Southern economy was largely agricultural and geared to exporting a large portion of its cotton and tobacco crops to Europe.  In the 1850’s the South accounted for anywhere from 72 to 82% of U. S. exports.  They were largely dependent, however, on Europe or the North for the manufactured goods needed for both agricultural production and consumer needs.  Northern states received about 20% of the South’s agricultural production.  The vast majority of export volume went to Europe.  A protective tariff was then a substantial benefit to Northern manufacturing states, but meant considerable economic hardship for the agricultural South

Northern political dominance enabled Clay and his allies in Congress to pass a tariff averaging 35% late in 1824. This was the cause of economic boom in the North, but economic hardship and political agitation in the South.  South Carolina was especially hard hit, the State’s exports falling 25% over the next two years.  In 1828 in a demonstration of unabashed partisanship and unashamed greed the Northern dominated Congress raised the average tariff level to 50%.  Despite strong Southern agitation for lower tariffs the Tariff of 1832 only nominally reduced the effective tariff rate and brought no relief to the South.  These last two tariffs are usually termed in history as the Tariffs of Abomination.

This led to the Nullification Crisis of 1832 when South Carolina called a state convention and “nullified” the 1828 and 1832 tariffs as unjust and unconstitutional.  The resulting constitutional crisis came very near provoking armed conflict at that time.  Through the efforts of former U. S. Vice President and U. S. Senator from South Carolina, John C. Calhoun, a compromise was effected in 1833 which over a few years reduced the tariff back to a normal level of about 15%.   Henry Clay and the Whigs were not happy, however, to have been forced into a compromise by Calhoun and South Carolina’s Nullification threat.  The tariff, however, remained at a level near 15% until 1860.  A lesson in economics, regional sensitivities, and simple fairness should have been learned from this confrontation, but if it was learned, it was ignored by ambitious political and business factions and personalities that would come on the scene of American history in the late 1850’s.

High protective tariffs were always the policy of the old Whig Party and had become the policy of the new Republican Party that replaced it. A recession beginning around 1857 gave the cause of protectionism an additional political boost in the Northern industrial states.

In May of 1860 the U. S. Congress passed the Morrill Tariff Bill (named for Republican Congressman and steel manufacturer, Justin S. Morrill of Vermont) raising the average tariff from about 15% to 37% with increases to 47% within three years.  Although this was remarkably reminiscent of the Tariffs of Abomination which had led in 1832 to a constitutional crisis and threats of secession and armed force, the U. S. House of Representatives passed the Bill 105 to 64.  Out of 40 Southern Congressmen only one Tennessee Congressman voted for it.

U. S. tariff revenues already fell disproportionately on the South, accounting for 87% of the total.  While the tariff protected Northern industrial interests, it raised the cost of living and commerce in the South substantially. It also reduced the trade value of their agricultural exports to Europe. These combined to place a severe economic hardship on many Southern states.  Even more galling was that 80% or more of these tax revenues were expended on Northern public works and industrial subsidies, thus further enriching the North at the expense of the South.

 In the 1860 election, Lincoln, a former Whig and great admirer of Henry Clay, campaigned for the high protective tariff provisions of the Morrill Tariff, which had also been incorporated into the Republican Party Platform.   Lincoln further endorsed the Morrill Tariff and its concepts in his first inaugural speech and signed the Act into law a few days after taking office in March of 1861.  Southern leaders had seen it coming.  Southern protests had been of no avail.  Now the South was inflamed with righteous indignation, and Southern leaders began to call for Secession.

At first Northern public opinion as reflected in Northern newspapers of both parties recognized the right of the Southern States to secede and favored peaceful separation.  A November 21, 1860, editorial in the Cincinnati Daily Press said this:

     “We believe that the right of any member of this Confederacy to dissolve its political relations with the
     others and assume an independent position is absolute.”

The New York Times on March 21, 1861, reflecting the great majority of editorial opinion in the North summarized in an editorial:

     “There is a growing sentiment throughout the North in favor of letting the Gulf States go.”

Northern industrialists became nervous, however, when they realized a tariff dependent North would be competing against a free trade South.  They feared not only loss of tax revenue, but considerable loss of trade.  Newspaper editorials began to reflect this nervousness.  Lincoln had promised in his inaugural speech that he would preserve the Union and the tariff.  Three days after manipulating the South into firing on the tariff collection facility of Fort Sumter in volatile South Carolina, on April 15, 1861, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to put down the Southern rebellion.  This caused the Border States to secede along with the Gulf States.  Lincoln undoubtedly calculated that the mere threat of force backed by more unified Northern public opinion would quickly put down secession.  His gambit, however, failed spectacularly and would erupt into a terrible and costly war for four years.  The Union Army’s lack of success early in the war, the need to keep anti-slavery England from coming into the war on the side of the South, and Lincoln’s need to appease the radical abolitionists in the North led to increasing promotion of freeing the slaves as a noble cause to justify what was really a dispute over just taxation and States Rights.

Writing in December of 1861 in a London weekly publication, the famous English author, Charles Dickens, who was a strong opponent of slavery, said these things about the war going on in America:

     “The Northern onslaught upon slavery is no more than a piece of specious humbug disguised to
     conceal its desire for economic control of the United States.”

     “Union means so many millions a year lost to the South; secession means loss of the same millions to
     the North.  The love of money is the root of this as many, many other evils.  The quarrel between the
     North and South is, as it stands, solely a fiscal quarrel.”

Karl Marx, like most European socialists of the time favored the North.  In an 1861 article published in England, he articulated very well what the major British newspapers, the Times, the Economist, and Saturday Review, had been saying:

     “The war between the North and South is a tariff war.  The war, is further, not for any principle, does
     not touch the question of slavery, and in fact turns on the Northern lust for power.”

A horrific example of the damage that protective tariffs can exact was also seen in later history. One of the causes of the Great Depression of 1930-1939 was the Hawley-Smoot Act, a high tariff passed in 1930 that Congress mistakenly thought would help the country. While attempting to protect domestic industry from foreign imports, the unanticipated effect was to reduce the nation’s exports and thereby help increase unemployment to the devastating figure of 25%.  It is fairly well known by competent and honest economists now that protective tariffs usually do more harm than good, often considerably more harm than good.  However, economic ignorance and political expediency often combine to overrule longer-term public good.  As the Uncivil War of 1861-5 proves, the human and economic costs for such shortsighted political expediency and partisan greed can be enormous.

The Morrill Tariff illustrates very well one of the problems with majoritarian democracy.  A majority can easily exploit a regional, economic, ethnic, or religious minority (or any other minority) unmercifully unless they have strong constitutional guarantees that can be enforced, e. g., States Rights, Nullification, etc.  The need to limit centralized government power to counter this natural depravity in men was recognized by the founding fathers.  They knew well the irresistible tendencies in both monarchy and democracy for both civil magistrates and the electorate to succumb to the temptations of greed, self-interest, and the lust for power.   Thus they incorporated into the Constitution such provisions as the separation of powers and very important provisions enumerating and delegating only certain functions and powers to the federal government and retaining others at the state level and lower. Such constitutional provisions including the very specific guaranty of States Rights and limits to the power of the Federal Government in the 10th Amendment are unfortunately now largely ignored by all three branches of the Federal Government, and their constant infringement seldom contested by the States.


The Tariff question and the States Rights question were therefore strongly linked.  Both are linked to the broader issues of limited government and a strong Constitution.  The Morrill Tariff dealt the South a flagrant political injustice and impending economic hardship and crisis.  It therefore made Secession a very compelling alternative to an exploited and unequal union with the North.

How to handle the slavery question was an underlying tension between North and South, but one of many tensions. It cannot be said to be the cause of the war.  Fully understanding the slavery question and its relations to those tensions is beyond the scope of this article, but numerous historical facts demolish the propagandistic morality play that a virtuous North invaded the evil South to free the slaves.  Five years after the end of the War, prominent Northern abolitionist, attorney and legal scholar, Lysander Spooner, put it this way:

     “All these cries of having ‘abolished slavery,’ of having ‘saved the country,’ of having ‘preserved the
     Union,’ of establishing a ‘government of consent,’ and of ‘maintaining the national honor’ are all gross,
     shameless, transparent cheats—so transparent that they ought to deceive no one.”

Yet apparently many today are still deceived, are deliberately deceived, and even prefer to be deceived.

Unjust taxation has been the cause of many tensions and much bloodshed throughout history and around the world. The Morrill Tariff was certainly a powerful factor predisposing the South to seek its independence and determine its own destiny.  As outrageous and unjust as the Morrill Tariff was, its importance has been largely ignored and even purposely obscured.  It does not fit the politically correct images and myths of popular American history.  Truth, however, is always the high ground.  It will have the inevitable victory

In addition to the devastating loss of life and leadership during the War, the South suffered considerable damage to property, livestock, and crops.  The policies of “Reconstruction” and “carpetbagger” state governments further exploited and robbed the South, considerably retarding economic recovery. Further, high tariffs and discriminatory railroad shipping taxes continued to favor Northern economic interests and impoverish the South for generations after the war.  It is only in relatively recent history that the political and economic fortunes of the South have begun to rise.

One last point needs to be made.  The war of 1861-65 was not a “civil” war.  To call it the “Civil War” is not a historically accurate and honest use of language. It is the propaganda of the victors having attained popular usage. No one in the South was attempting to overthrow the U. S. government.  Few Southerners had any interest in overthrowing their own or anyone else’s state governments.  The Southern states had seen that continued union with the North would jeopardize their liberties and economic wellbeing.  Through the proper constitutional means of state conventions and referendums they sought to withdraw from the Union and establish their independence just as the American Colonies had sought their independence from Great Britain in 1776 and for very similar reasons.  The Northern industrialists, however, were not willing to give up their Southern Colonies.  A more appropriate name for the uncivil war of 1861-65 would be “The War for Southern Independence.”

 But had it not been for the Morrill Tariff there would have been no rush to Secession by Southern states and very probably no war.  The Morrill Tariff of 1860, so unabashed and unashamed in its short-sighted, partisan greed, stands as an astonishing monument to the self-centered depravity of man and to its consequences.  No wonder most Americans would like to see it forgotten and covered over with a more morally satisfying but largely false version of the causes of the Uncivil War.

Mike Scruggs is an historian who now lives in Hendersonville, NC

Principal References and Recommended Reading:

Charles Adams; For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes in the Course of Civilization, 1993.

Charles Adams; When in the Course of Human Events: Argueing the Case for Southern Secession, 2000.

Frank Conner; The South Under Siege 1830-2000; A History of the Relations Between North and South, 2002.

John G. Van Deusen; Economic Bases of Disunion in South Carolina, 1928.  Reprinted by Crown Rights Book Company, 2003.

Thomas J. DiLorenzo; The Real Lincoln: A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an Unnecessary War, 2002.

Ludwell H. Johnson; North Against South: The American Iliad 1848-1977, 2002 printing.

Mark Thornton; Tariffs, Blockades and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War, 2004.

Principal Reference and Recommended Listening

Dr. David Livingston; Rethinking Lincoln: Abe Lincoln and Slavery, Lectures at League of South Conference, 2000.  Available on cassette or CD at Apologia Book Shoppe online.  A valuable portion of this lecture concerns the Morrill Tariff.

Revised 4 June 2005

Lincoln's not so well known racist verbage, other info on Slavery and Northern Racist laws

Lincoln & the Northern state government's views on Race

 For one to fully understand the Causes of the War, one must look at it as a mid 19th century American would look at it, not how a 21st century american would look at it

The Lincoln quotes on white superiority are well known by both sides of the great debate.  The most famous of these quotes was spoken by ABE in the Lincoln-Douglas debates while debating in Ottowa, Illinois on August 21st 1858, Mr. Lincoln stated, quite plainly, that:

"I have no disposition to introduce political and social equality between the white and black races. There is a physical difference between the two, which in my judgment will probably forever forbid their living together on terms of respect, social and political equality, and inasmuch as it becomes a necessity that there should be a superiority somewhere, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position;". -Abraham Lincoln

Most Lincoln supporters say he was being a masterful politician and garnering votes and that he personally did not believe that. (which then destroys the HONEST ABE argument that I was told in elementary school, that Lincoln never told a lie) Nonetheless, a less talked about aspect of Lincoln's indifference to the black race was his obsession with colonization.  The issue in the 1850s and 60s even in the south was not the morality of slavery, rather what to do with 3 million freed African-Americans (some only one generation removed from tribal Africa). No other nation on earth had the problem, so the United States had no "playbook" to follow.  Lincoln believed in deporting all people of color off the continent because he believed the mere existence of blacks caused white suffering/misfortune.. pretty strong stuff from the "great emancipator". the sentence from the speech is :

"You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss, but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think your race suffer very greatly, many of them by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. In a word we suffer on each side. If this is admitted, it affords a reason at least why we should be separated." - Abraham Lincoln

(full speech is at the end of the post)

Lincoln believed that race was a giant barrier that would forever prohibit whites and blacks to coexist. More importantly, the reason he believed that goes back to the first quote of this post: he believed whites to be superior and simply thought everything would be better if blacks (free or slave) were 100% eradicated from the United States. As shown in the full speech at the end of the article, Lincoln does not consider any people of color to be truly AMERICAN he considers them ALIEN, (not native) Lincoln says the people of color should all return to their native soil. By using those words he is showing his belief that people of color simply DO NOT BELONG in the United States. This is why Lincoln had such strong beliefs in Colonization of all colored people.

Times were different back then, due to the institution of slavery back to before Christ.  Most men in the western world believed there was a real difference between the races, Lincoln included.  My argument is that people who claim "Lincoln & the Federal government fought to free slaves and the south simply fought to keep slaves" fail to put into context the beliefs, issues, and how most people (north&south) thought back then. It becomes clear how and why detractors, critics, and intellectual dishonest historians call all southerners racist and claim the war was simply about the right to keep slaves when one understands that they look at the war & the Confederacy through the context of present day, not of 1861.

  

A good argument to those that believe the entire war was fought over the right to keep slaves or not has to deal with the CORWIN AMMENDMENT. The corwin amendment would have kept slavery legal in the states it was already legal FOREVER under FEDERAL LAW. Ironically, it would have become the 13th amendment had it been ratified. Weeks before the outbreak of war, Lincoln penned a letter to governors of each seceded state guaranteeing the CORWIN AMENDMENT to pass if the states would not leave the union. The governors/states declined the offer.

Simply put: Lincoln guaranteed the southern states that slavery would be legal forever under the constitution in all states where it was already legal if the states decided to stay in the union. If as all southern detractors say: "the south ONLY seceded for the right to keep/own slaves", then the south would have achieved victory & got its wish without ever having gone to war. But as we all know, they declined the offer.. which means there were OTHER ISSUES. This is simple logic, if all the seceding state's wanted was the right to keep slaves and know that it would not be outlawed, they would have got their wish in 1861 and the Union would have been re-assembled and slavery would have been legal in the cotton states.

In his inaugural address, Lincoln noted Congressional approval of the Corwin amendment and stated that he "had no objection to its being made express and irrevocable." As shown in this piece Lincoln was certainly not overly concerned with the "plight of the slaves" and he certainly wasn't interested in equality or social justice. As shown below, Northern state laws showed Northerners did not want a single person of color (free or slave) to enter their state.

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 Further looking at the issue as a 1850/60 American viewed it

As stated above and believed by all sane rational men in the 21st century, Slavery's morality was rarely questioned even in those times.  However, the biggest problem facing 19th century America was : what to do about it? Simply freeing the slaves was not the issue, the issue was what to do with 3 million people that had no property, wealth, education of their own ONCE they were free.  Lincoln believed deportation was the only rational way, and to be fair he was not alone.  Many other early American Political leaders (such as Andrew Jackson) believed that once slavery was abolished colonization was the only way to logistically accomplish that.  

Another way to further examine the complexity of the issue was to look at recent state laws of the time created by northern states dealing with blacks. 

OREGON CONSTITUTION: No free negro, or mulatto, not residing in this State at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall come, reside, or be within this State, or hold any real estate, or make any contracts, or maintain any suit therein; and the Legislative Assembly shall provide by penal laws, for the removal, by public officers, of all such negroes, and mulattoes, and for their effectual exclusion from the State, and for the punishment of persons who shall bring them into the state, or employ, or harbor them.

INDIANA had the exact same law

ILLINOIS: PROHIBITS ALL FREE BLACKS UNLESS THEY PAID 1,000 USD (alot of cash in mid 19th century USA!)

ILLINOIS STATUTES: #12 If any person or persons shall permit or suffer any slave or slaves, servant or servants of color, to the number of three or more, to assemble in his, her or their outhouse, yard or shed, for the purpose of dancing or revelling, either by night or by day, the person or persons so offending shall forfeit and pay the sum of twenty dollars with cost to any person or persons who will sue for and recover the same by action of debt or indictment, in any court of record proper to try the same.
     Section 13. It shall be the duty of all coroners, sheriffs, judges and justices of the peace, who shall see or know of, or be informed of any such assemblage of slaves or servants, immediately to commit such slaves or servants to the jail of the county, and on view or proof thereof to order each-and every such slave or servant to be whipped not exceeding thirty-nine stripes on his or her bare back.

These are several (of many) examples of how in northern states the idea to solve the problem was to simply not allow ANY people of color (free or slave) into their state.  The truth is the first segregation in this nation was in the north, not the south. Simply put the northern manumission laws goal was to rid the entire north of the African population (and they were very successful).

In conclusion, people arguing the south only fought for the right to keep slaves don't put themselves in the shoes of American politicians (north and south) of the mid 19th century. One cannot study politics, psychology, or any like minded subject in history if they do not first understand how and why people thought the way they did at the time being studied. The issue of slavery by the 1860s was not the morality of its practice, but the logistics and practicality of what to do ONCE the SLAVES were freed. History shows us free blacks prior, during and after the war in the north struggled mightily to exist. Northern AND southern politicians of the mid 19th century knew the complexity and problems that would arise when all 3 million slaves were to be freed. Even in 1861, the majority of politicians (through the Corwin Amendment) were willing to keep slavery legal in the cotton states, outlaw it everywhere else and deal with the problem that way. The Corwin amendment being guaranteed to be ratified as the 13th amendment to the seceding states and the states refusal shows the southern states were fighting for alot more than the right to keep and own slaves because that right was guaranteed to them forever by Abraham Lincoln himself in 1861.  

-Matt Bowden-

Lewisville TEXAS

Video of the day:

Thomas DiLorenzo 1 hour interview on CSPAN

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Lincoln's full speech to the committee of colored men:

This afternoon the President of the United States gave audience to a Committee of colored men at the White House. They were introduced by the Rev. J. Mitchell, Commissioner of Emigration. E. M. Thomas, the Chairman, remarked that they were there by invitation to hear what the Executive had to say to them. Having all been seated, the President, after a few preliminary observations, informed them that a sum of money had been appropriated by Congress, and placed at his disposition for the purpose of aiding the colonization in some country of the people, or a portion of them, of African descent, thereby making it his duty, as it had for a long time been his inclination, to favor that cause; and why, he asked, should the people of your race be colonized, and where? Why should they leave this country? This is, perhaps, the first question for proper consideration. You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss, but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think your race suffer very greatly, many of them by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. In a word we suffer on each side. If this is admitted, it affords a reason at least why we should be separated. You here are freemen I suppose.

A Voice: Yes, sir.

The President---Perhaps you have long been free, or all your lives. Your race are suffering, in my judgment, the greatest wrong inflicted on any people. But even when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far removed from being placed on an equality with the white race. You are cut off from many of the advantages which the other race enjoy. The aspiration of men is to enjoy equality with the best when free, but on this broad continent, not a single man of your race is made the equal of a single man of ours. Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is still upon you.

I do not propose to discuss this, but to present it as a fact with which we have to deal. I cannot alter it if I would. It is a fact, about which we all think and feel alike, I and you. We look to our condition, owing to the existence of the two races on this continent. I need not recount to you the effects upon white men, growing out of the institution of Slavery. I believe in its general evil effects on the white race. See our present condition---the country engaged in war!---our white men cutting one another's throats, none knowing how far it will extend; and then consider what we know to be the truth. But for your race among us there could not be war, although many men engaged on either side do not care for you one way or the other. Nevertheless, I repeat, without the institution of Slavery and the colored race as a basis, the war could not have an existence.

It is better for us both, therefore, to be separated. I know that there are free men among you, who even if they could better their condition are not as much inclined to go out of the country as those, who being slaves could obtain their freedom on this condition. I suppose one of the principal difficulties in the way of colonization is that the free colored man cannot see that his comfort would be advanced by it. You may believe you can live in Washington or elsewhere in the United States the remainder of your life, perhaps more so than you can in any foreign country, and hence you may come to the conclusion that you have nothing to do with the idea of going to a foreign country. This is (I speak in no unkind sense) an extremely selfish view of the case.

But you ought to do something to help those who are not so fortunate as yourselves. There is an unwillingness on the part of our people, harsh as it may be, for you free colored people to remain with us. Now, if you could give a start to white people, you would open a wide door for many to be made free. If we deal with those who are not free at the beginning, and whose intellects are clouded by Slavery, we have very poor materials to start with. If intelligent colored men, such as are before me, would move in this matter, much might be accomplished. It is exceedingly important that we have men at the beginning capable of thinking as white men, and not those who have been systematically oppressed.

There is much to encourage you. For the sake of your race you should sacrifice something of your present comfort for the purpose of being as grand in that respect as the white people. It is a cheering thought throughout life that something can be done to ameliorate the condition of those who have been subject to the hard usage of the world. It is difficult to make a man miserable while he feels he is worthy of himself, and claims kindred to the great God who made him. In the American Revolutionary war sacrifices were made by men engaged in it; but they were cheered by the future. Gen. Washington himself endured greater physical hardships than if he had remained a British subject. Yet he was a happy man, because he was engaged in benefiting his race---something for the children of his neighbors, having none of his own.

The colony of Liberia has been in existence a long time. In a certain sense it is a success. The old President of Liberia, Roberts, has just been with me---the first time I ever saw him. He says they have within the bounds of that colony between 300,000 and 400,000 people, or more than in some of our old States, such as Rhode Island or Delaware, or in some of our newer States, and less than in some of our larger ones. They are not all American colonists, or their descendants. Something less than 12,000 have been sent thither from this country. Many of the original settlers have died, yet, like people elsewhere, their offspring outnumber those deceased.